Social Justice and its Dangers
Justice
is an attribute which is consistently ascribed to God in Scripture and
presented as a defining characteristic of his reign (Deut. 32:4; Ps. 97:2; Isa. 30:18b; Rev. 15:3; etc.). Because he is just, he calls us to live justly with one another (Gen. 18:19;
Ps. 33:5; Jer. 5:1; Mic. 6:8; etc.). This
call includes laboring to form a just society (Deut. 1:13-17; 16:18-20; Isa.
1:16-17; Jer. 22:3; Amos 5:15, 24; etc.). This is not merely incidental to our call,
but integral to it. Pursuing
justice—both personally and in broader society—is one of the weightier matters
of the law (Matt. 23:23). It is, in
fact, one of the ways in which we live by the golden rule and fulfill the
command, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18; Matt. 22:39; Jas.
2:8).
There
are few who would argue against justice as the foundation of civilized society,
but there is perhaps less consensus now than at any point in our nation’s history
as to what justice is. It’s becoming painfully clear that not
everything that goes by the name of justice is what it claims to be. For this reason, we must be careful not to
jump on the bandwagon of every movement that claims to advance its cause. Many people want the benefit of the noble
connotations of the word but drain it of its meaning. Worse, they fill it with an opposite
meaning. It’s a classic example of
doublespeak—a distortion of language for political purposes. This is especially true with the buzzword,
“social justice.”
Social Justice
It’s
a pity that this otherwise good and useful term has been co-opted to promote a
vision of society that is profoundly unjust. As a result, some have argued that we should
avoid using it altogether. This may
indeed be wise given how muddled the definition has become.
Some,
too, have argued that we shouldn’t use the term social justice because justice
needs no modifier.
Justice is just justice. No adjective needed. In a
saner world, modifiers would be unobjectionable. They would simply refer to different spheres of justice. Social justice would then simply refer to
justice as it relates to public policy as distinguished from the behavior of individuals in their daily lives (i.e.,
personal righteousness, integrity, and fair-dealing). Criminal
justice, economic justice, and racial justice, in turn, might be
considered subsets of social justice—public policy as it relates to each of
these issues. However, we encounter the
same definitional problems with these subsets as we do with the general
category.[1]
If
we use the term social justice to describe the historic efforts to abolish
slavery, end Jim Crow, and ensure civil rights, or the current efforts to
abolish sex-trafficking, protect the unborn, and root out government and
corporate corruption, all well and good.
But the term today has become loaded with a set of assumptions that are
the very antithesis of justice—assumptions associated with Antonio Gramsci’s
idea of cultural hegemony and the call
for a “long march through the institutions,”
together with the critical theory and neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt
School, postmodernism’s rejection of metanarratives,[2]
and the activism of groups like Antifa, Black Lives Matter, and the Me Too
movement.
Assumptions of the Social Justice Movement
What
assumptions are we talking about?
Perhaps more could be identified, but these are the ones I have in mind.[3]
Assumption 1: Human relationships are best understood in
terms of power dynamics and these dynamics affect relationships between both
individuals (husband-wife, parent-child, employer-employee, etc.) and groups (sexes,
races, classes, etc.)
Assumption 2: A power imbalance necessarily creates an
adversarial and abusive relationship between those in power (“the oppressors”)
and those lacking power (“the oppressed”)
Assumption 3: Our identity as individuals is subordinate to
and inseparable from our group identity, such that we share in the status of
either oppressor or oppressed, relative to a given identity marker (sex, race,
class, etc.)
Assumption 4: The
most important human endeavor is liberation of the oppressed by destroying all
hierarchies and achieving a completely egalitarian society
Evaluation and Critique
Each
of these assumptions contains an element of truth but is otherwise deeply
flawed.
Assumption 1
The
first assumption, that human relationships are best understood in terms of
power dynamics, is reductionistic to the extreme. There is no doubt that power plays a role in
human relationships, sometimes a deleterious one; but only the most cynical people
could view it as playing the most important role. Depending on the relationship in question,
why may not love, trust, friendship, respect, a sense of ethical
responsibility, or a commitment to cooperation for mutual benefit lie at the
heart of it? Most human relationships
have a mix of motives and goals that can’t be so easily explained in terms of
power.
Assumption 2
Second,
where power is a prominent element of
a relationship, it isn’t necessarily abusive, as the second assumption
suggests. For example, parents have
physical, legal, and other forms of power over their children; but most
parent-child relationships are loving, protective, and nurturing. Their power is not a threat, but a benefit to
their children. Likewise, employers have
power over their employees; but if both parties are thinking properly about it
they’ll recognize that cooperation toward the success of the business benefits
them both. Employees will work diligently,
and employers will compensate them as well as possible. There are temptations and potential failings on
both sides of the equation, of course, but there is nothing inherently abusive about the power
differentials in these relationships.
Assumption 3
The
third assumption—that our identity as individuals is subordinate to and
inseparable from our group identity, such that we share in the status of either
oppressor or oppressed, relative to a given identity marker—is manifestly and dangerously false. This is where the concept of power dynamics
between group identities comes into play in the most invidious ways. It’s what lies behind the identity politics
that has proven to be so divisive in our country over the last few
decades. This group is pitted against that
group in terms of the alleged oppressor and oppressed categories. The individual members of each category are
viewed as either perpetrator or victim accordingly. All women are victims of “the patriarchy,”
for example. Never mind if you’re a
woman but have never been personally mistreated by a man; you’re a victim in
other ways you may have never realized. If you’re a man, you’re complicit in the
abuses of “the patriarchy” even if you have never personally abused a woman. Likewise, all racial minorities are victims
of white-supremacy; all homosexuals are victims of hetero-normativity; all poor
people are victims of exploitation by the rich; and on and on and on.
If
you’re a member of the dominant group, you’re an oppressor, even if you’ve
never personally done anything to harm anyone.
If you’re not a member of the dominant group, you’re a victim even if
you don’t realize it. Despite protests
to the contrary from the other side, this is straight-up sexism, racism,
classism, etc., the very things they say they oppose.
There’s
no doubt that we are all influenced by our sex, race, and class, but also by a
host of other variables: natural
intelligence, education, looks, height, weight, health, upbringing, social
circles, religion, and culture. All
these things go into the shaping of one’s personality and character, but in the final analysis, individuals must
be evaluated in terms of their actual behavior not on the basis of the supposed
collective guilt or innocence of their “group identity.”
Social
justice advocates often refer to a concept they call intersectionality, which
is the multiple layers of victimhood one suffers. For example, a black lesbian is a three-fold
victim. As a woman, she’s a victim of
the patriarchy; being black, she’s a victim of white-supremacy; as a lesbian,
she’s a victim of our culture’s adherence to hetero-normativity. If she should also happen to be a Muslim, she
would have yet another claim to victimhood.
And we should understand that there
is no more valuable currency today than possessing the status of victim. One can say all kinds of outrageous things,
and get away with all kinds of outrageous behavior, if one plays the victim
card properly.
Take
as an example, an article that recently appeared in the Washington Post,
entitled Why can’t we hate men? in
which the author explains why she believes men as a class deserve to be
hated. She says she objects to other
feminists who say, “we don’t hate men,” and “men are not the problem, the
system is.” She objects to feminists
saying these things because she believes men are the problem—not simply bad men, misbehaving men, but men as men.
How is it that she is not scorned as a sexist? Because according to social justice
assumptions, only men can be guilty of sexism.
Why
is that? For the same reason that only
whites can be guilty of racism. Recently
the New York Times hired an editorial writer named Sarah Jeong who tweeted a number of insulting things about
white people, including, “It’s kind of sick how much joy I get out of being
cruel to old white men.” Many people
pointed out that if a white person had said this about an Asian or Black or
Hispanic person, it would rightly be called out as racism. Her defense was that in these tweets she had
adopted the tactics of those who had directed racist tweets at her. In other words, she was “counter-trolling”
them and she apologized for saying such hateful things.
Fair
enough. But what I found interesting—and
what was perfectly consistent with social justice assumptions—was that many of
her defenders claimed that even
if she had meant what she said about white people, it wouldn’t have been racist
because as a minority she is, by
definition, incapable of racism.
Historically, racism has been defined as racial prejudice—negatively
stereotyping members of a racial group.
The new social justice definition requires the element of power. Racism is not merely prejudice, they say, but
prejudice + power. As a minority, Jeong
doesn’t have power; therefore, she can’t possibly be a racist. Or so the reasoning goes. It doesn’t seem to occur to them that as an
editorial writer for the New York Times she has far more power than say an old
white farmer in Kansas.
It’s
fair to observe that racism is at its most dangerous when it’s combined with
power; but the absence of power doesn’t excuse negative racial stereotyping no
matter who does it to whom.
Social
justice warriors assume a general
complicity in evil among members of dominant groups. And if there should happen to be a specific charge of wrongdoing, there is
a presumption of guilt if the accused is in a dominant group relative to the
accuser. These assumptions skew the very
concept of justice. The traditional
Western view, which is grounded in Biblical jurisprudence, holds that the
accused is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden of
proof lies with the accuser. The social
justice view is that the accused is presumed to be innocent or guilty depending
on his or her power status vis-Ã -vis the accuser. This stance is taken by activists associated
with the Black Lives Matter and Me Too movements. It’s quickly becoming the default assumption
that if a white cop shoots a black suspect, it must be due to racism; that if
the suspect had been white he wouldn’t have been shot. Further, if a police inquiry into the
shooting exonerates the officer, it’s assumed to be evidence of institutional racism
in the department. The actual evidence
of the case is of less importance than the power dynamics involved.
This
is the origin of the “believe all women” campaign. Certainly, allegations of sexual assault
should be taken seriously. They should
be investigated thoroughly, and if the accused is found guilty, he should be
punished. But a judgment must be made based
on the evidence, not based the sex, race, or socio-economic status of either
the accuser or the accused.
You shall do no injustice in court. You shall
not be partial to the poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness shall
you judge your neighbor.
Leviticus 19:15
It
is as wrong-headed to say “believe women” because
they're women, as it is to say “believe men” because they're men, or whites
because their white, or blacks because they're black, or citizens because
they're citizens, or aliens because they're aliens, or the rich because they're
rich, or the poor because they're poor.
Justice demands that a decision be reached based on the evidence,
nothing else.
Assumption
4
The fourth assumption—that liberation
for the oppressed comes by tearing down all
hierarchies to achieve an egalitarian society—reflects animus toward reality
itself. To be rid of all power is
impossible. Hierarchy is written into
the very fabric of creation. It’s
inescapable.
At
various times in life we will either be in
authority or under authority, and
usually both at the same time in different relationships. For example, a man may have authority in the
church as an elder but be the low man on the totem pole at his place of
work. A woman may be in authority in the work place as a
business owner, with employees under her, but she’s under the authority of the
law of the land. One may be both in
authority and under authority in the same setting. A mid-level manager has those over him and
those under him, much like a member of the military. A centurion told Jesus, “I too am a man under
authority, with soldiers under me” (Matt. 8:9a).
Our
task is not to rid the world of hierarchies, but to exercise power and respond
to power in godly ways. Paul’s
instructions in Ephesians 5:21-6:9 and Colossians 3:18-4:1 are very
helpful. In these passages he deals with
three domestic relationships: husbands
and wives, parents and children, and masters and slaves. In each case, he first addresses the party under authority and then the one in authority. Summarizing, the one under authority is
instructed to be submissive, as unto the Lord, and the one in authority is
instructed to exercise a gentle and beneficent rule.
See part 2, Social Justice: What's Marx Got to do With It?
See part 2, Social Justice: What's Marx Got to do With It?
[1] This is true at least with economic and
racial justice, not so much with criminal justice.
[2] See for example, Jean-Francois
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press,
[1979] 1984), p. xxiv
[3] I have adapted and expanded the four
premises of Critical Theory identified by Neil Shenvi in A Long Review of Race, Class, and Gender – Part 3 (https://shenviapologetics.wordpress.com/a-long-review-of-race-class-and-gender-part-3/)
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