When Self-Description Trumps Reality
We owe
Andrej Pejić a debt of gratitude. He has expressed perhaps as succinctly as possible
the political end game in the battle over sexual identity.
Pejić, who was
born in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later emigrated to Australia, first made a name
for himself as an androgynous male model. Describing himself as “living between
genders,” he has at times appeared on the runway in both men’s and women’s
clothing in the same
show.
In 2014, he underwent “sex reassignment surgery” and changed his name from
Andrej to Andreja.
In a
public statement
following his surgery, he said, “To be perceived as what you say you are is a
basic human right.” This concise statement is a perfect summary of the goal of
the “transgender” movement. But it’s a troubling statement for several reasons,
not the least of which is the fact that it is the business of governments to
protect and defend basic human rights.[1]
If Pejić has a
right to be perceived as a woman, what legal obligations does this impose on
his perceivers (i.e., the rest of
us)? What if some of them do not
perceive him to be a woman, but only as a man pretending to be a woman? Will
they be punished for their refusal to go along with the pretense? Apparently, in
New York they
will.
And other jurisdictions are likely to follow suit.
There
was a time when a man passing himself off as a woman or a woman as a man might
have been thought quirky at best, sexually deviant at worst, but at least it
was left up to the observer as to what to make of it. That time is no more.
Other
questions arise, too. Is this basic human right to be perceived as what you say
you are limited only to “transgenders”? If so, on what grounds? Why might the
principle not also apply to race? Rachel
Dolezal thinks it should. She’s the white woman who for years passed
herself off as black, even becoming president of the Spokane chapter of the
NAACP. She admits that she was “biologically born
white” but says that she identifies as black. Does she also have a
basic human right to be perceived as what she says she is? Many have said no, she
is illicitly transferring to race what only properly applies to “gender.” But
if one person’s self-description must govern another person’s perception in the
matter of gender, why should it not do the same with respect to race?
And then
there is the issue of age. A 52 year-old Canadian man identifies
as a six-year-old girl, making him—according to the current
vernacular—both “transgender” and “trans-age.” If he has a basic human right to
be perceived by others as a female (à la Pejić) does
he also have a basic human right to be perceived as a child? If not, why not? If
so, does this right to be perceived as a child impose an obligation upon the
rest of us—his perceivers—to treat him as one? And how consistently does he
want us to do so? Must local officials in his case enforce compulsory school
attendance laws and age restrictions for working, driving, smoking, and
drinking alcohol? If he has sex, would his partner be charged with statutory
rape? If he has a right to be perceived as what he says he is, it seems that
logical consistency requires us to treat him as a child in all these ways and
more.
On the
other hand, what if a thirty-year-old identifies as seventy? Does this impose
an obligation on the federal government to treat him as a senior, so that he could
draw social security and use Medicare? Would restaurants and hotels be required
to give him a senior discount or be threatened with a lawsuit for
discrimination if they offer the discount to seniors who really are seniors but not to him?
And
what about a man who identifies
as a dog? Does he have a
right to be perceived and treated as such by the rest of us? And if so, we have
to ask again about the matter of consistency. Would local leash laws apply?
Must he be neutered? Would the law require him to be vaccinated like a dog? If
he has sex with a human being would his partner be prosecuted for violating
anti-bestiality laws? May he use the fire-hydrant like a dog, or would he be charged with
public urination like a man?
What
about an able-bodied person who identifies
as disabled? Does such a person have a basic human right to
be perceived as disabled? And would he be eligible for disability pay?
Perhaps
Pejić would
say I am taking matters too far. Perhaps he would say that his comments should
only be understood with regard to the perception of “gender” and that applying
them to race, age, species, and disability is unreasonable. But why is it any
more unreasonable than applying them to “gender”?
[1] We can
think of the Declaration of Independence:
“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure
these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men…”
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